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BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS: FROM NEGOTIATION SPACE TO AGREEMENT ZONES 
 
 
Abstract 
Brexit is decidedly a “big question”. We agree with International Business scholars who say that such 
questions need to be addressed using an inter-disciplinary approach. We use bargaining theory models 
of rational behavior and the negotiation literature to explain various Brexit options and predict their 
consequences. Considering the lack of relevant experiential knowledge, and the multidimensional 
high-stakes negotiations underway, it is little wonder that anxiety is growing across all 28 European 
Union member states. Our analysis supports a coherent approach from rational bargaining model to 
real-life international negotiation. We position outcome scenarios in different agreement zones and 
explore their ramifications. 
 
Keywords: Bargaining theory, Negotiation analysis, Agreement zone, Brexit negotiations, outcome 
scenarios    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Some are doubtful whether international business (IB) research is up to tackling business—and indeed 
societal--big questions (Buckley, 2002; Buckley, Doh, & Benischke, 2017). Brexit is undeniably such 
a question. International business takes place within a framework of institutions that govern the 
movement of goods, services, capital, and people, basically, the European Union four freedoms 
spelled out in the Treaty of Rome. These institutions are often challenged by patriotic and nationalist 
rhetoric. Agreements between nations, firms, and individuals facilitate trade and ensure smooth 
interaction. The negotiation of such agreements has long been an important research topic for IB 
scholars (Kapoor, 1970; Money, 1998; Sawyer & Guetzkow, 1965; Tung, 1982). Especially now, in an 
era fraught with nationalist movements, IB researchers are challenged to undertake inter-disciplinary 
and phenomena-driven negotiation research.  
 
Negotiation, as Walton and McKersie (1965: 3) succinctly put it, is “the deliberate interaction of two 
or more complex social units which are attempting to define or redefine the terms of their 
interdependence.” Lewicki, Weiss, and Lewin (1992) emphasize that negotiations do not only take 
place between individuals, but between groups and organizations. The literature consistently shows 
that greater gains can be achieved when a negotiation takes place within a single culture than when 
across a cultural divide (Imai & Gelfand, 2010), and that the negotiation process is more difficult 
when parties have different values and traditions (Volkema, 2012). Diverse cultural backgrounds 
affect the actors, their behavior in negotiations, and hence outcomes (Ghauri, 2003a).  
 
Article 50 of the European Union Lisbon Treaty states that any Member State may withdraw from the 
Union, and spells out the process for doing so.  In a referendum held on June 23, 2016 the British 
electorate voted by a margin of 3.8 per cent to accept a proposal to exit the EU. Months of uncertainty 
followed. In March 2017, the UK triggered Article 50 thereby beginning the process of exiting. A 
process dubbed Brexit, with far-reaching economic, social, and environmental consequences was 
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underway. Brexit constitutes a major discrete event which affects governments, firms, and individuals. 
It also presents an opportunity for IB scholars to examine the negotiation of an interesting set of 
international business issues and to have a say in an important geo-political event. International 
business, as a field that combines economics, sociology, psychology, political science, anthropology 
and management studies is ideally positioned to address the Brexit big question.  
 
We investigate the negotiation space—in essence, the ground covered by the UK government and the 
European Commission representing the states that will remain in the EU—and the agreement zones 
for Brexit outcomes.  After much heated internal political debate, what the UK government would 
seek to achieve in Brexit negotiations was published in a white paper (HM Government, 2017). This 
article focuses on the twelve principles set out in that policy statement, i.e., the strategic scenarios 
over the duration of the Brexit negotiations and the move from negotiation space (where the UK and 
EU meet) to agreement zones.  
 
After more than forty years of UK membership in the EU, the Brexit negotiations involve 
considerable complexity and uncertainty, and will have a life-changing impact on millions of citizens 
on both sides. There are an infinite number of potential outcomes in a negotiation like this one, but 
there are some salient possibilities. There are countries that do not have full EU membership but 
which do have a close relationship with the EU along the lines of which Brexit might be negotiated 
(Malhotra, 2016; Pötsch & Van Roosebeke, 2017). These countries constitute models as well for 
Brexit. The UK might look to the (1) Norway Model, (2) Switzerland Model, (3) Canada Model, (4) 
Ukraine Plus Model,  (5) Turkey Model (in order from high to low trade and immigration integration). 
It is also possible that no agreement for a future relationship will be struck, i.e., a No Deal option. 
Article 50 allows up to two years after a declaration of the intention to withdraw for the negotiation of 
a new relationship, a time constraint that adds to the pressure on negotiators. Our research questions 
are: What negotiation scenarios need to be considered? How will the strategic profiles of the various 
players influence the outcome? What agreement zones can be envisaged that would allow us to 
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predict the outcome?  
 
The Brexit negotiation space can be analyzed from rational and behavioral perspectives. Interactive 
decision-making can follow a game theory path with negotiators assumed to be rational players 
anticipating strategies and the outcome of their choices, or a behavioral one with uncertainties 
dominating their decision-making. International negotiations fall under the economics of international 
business with players exhibiting different forms of rationality (Casson & Wadeson, 2000), i.e., 
rational, bounded rational, or meta-rational. Raiffa, Richardson and Metcalfe (2002) see the 
negotiation process through four lenses: asymmetrically descriptive (psychological), symmetrically 
prescriptive (game theoretical), asymmetrically descriptive and prescriptive (negotiation analytical) 
and externally descriptive and prescriptive (conflict resolution via mediators). In summary, rational 
and behavioral models of decision making have a place in the negotiation analysis of international 
business and political negotiations. We apply bargaining theory to the Brexit case and consider zones 
of feasible and potential agreements. 
 
THE NEGOTIATION SPACE AND NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES 
 
Political background 
 
We start with the state of affairs at the outset of negotiations, sometimes termed the initial 
endowment. We highlight the policy positions of the UK and EU, then consider the movement of 
goods, services, capital, and people as important points in the negotiation space. The UK position 
summarized in the White Paper lists twelve negotiation goals (see Table 1): (1) provide certainty and 
clarity, (2) take control over own laws, (3) strengthen the union of England, Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales, 4) protect ties with the Republic of Ireland and maintain the common travel area, 
5) control immigration, 6) secure rights of UK and EU nationals, 7) protect workers’ rights, 8) ensure 
free trade with European markets, 9) secure new trade agreements with third countries, 10) ensure 
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continued science and innovation excellence, 11) cooperate with Europe on crime and terrorism, 12) 
achieve an orderly and smooth exit. It is important to note that the UK is economically dependent on 
the EU, indeed some 40% of its exports go to the EU, while just 10% of EU exports go to the UK.  
‘Insert Table 1 Here’ 
 
As for the EU, the European Commission holds that EU trade policy is created and implemented in a 
transparent and democratic manner and its goal is to serve European citizens by creating jobs and 
ensuring economic prosperity (EC Tradoc 151381). To this end, European negotiators rely on 
information received from the public before any negotiations start. During negotiations, the 
Commission acts on instructions received from the EU member states, and remains throughout fully 
accountable to them as well as to European civil society and to the European Parliament (European 
Commission, 2017). These terms mean that trade negotiations are usually quite complicated as 
agreements must honor and safeguard trade and migration rules. The EU has three main types of 
agreements (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/agreements/): Customs Union, 
which eliminate customs duties in bilateral trade and  establish joint customs tariffs on foreign 
imports, Association Agreements, Stabilization Agreements, Free Trade Agreements, and Economic 
Partnership Agreements, which remove or reduce custom duties on bilateral trade, and Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements, which provide a general framework for bilateral economic relations 
leaving as is existing tariffs. The Norway Model, Switzerland Model, Canada Model and Ukraine Plus 
Model are illustrative of these types of agreements (see Table 2). They are considered to be models 
that the UK might follow in its negotiations with the EU (Malhotra, 2016; Pötsch & Van Roosebeke, 
2017). We outline each of them briefly below:  
 
Norway Model. As a member of both the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European 
Economic Area (EEA), Norway has access to the single market, for which it makes payments to the 
EU. Norway is required to abide by the EU 4-freedoms principle of free movement of goods, services, 
capital, and people. It also must abide by most EU laws but does not have a formal say in their 
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formulation and has no veto rights on their application.  
Switzerland Model. Switzerland is a member of the EFTA, but not the EEA.  It has less access to the 
single market than Norway, but more latitude in the application of EU laws. It is further connected to 
the EU by various treaties covering specific sectors. There are about 100 bilateral agreements, none of 
which cover the financial sector. The UK will therefore need to consider whether to use this model 
with a very strong financial service sector. The Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons (AFMP) 
finalized this year reduces the ability of Switzerland to place limits on EU citizen immigration.   
Canada Model. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) eliminates 98% of 
tariffs.  There is visa-free travel between Canada and most EU member states but there is no right of 
free movement of people between Canada and the EU. 
Ukraine Plus Model.  Ukraine, like Canada, has entered a comprehensive free trade agreement with 
the EU to remove or reduce tariffs in bilateral trade. There is visa-free travel between Ukraine and 
most EU member states but no right of free movement of people between Ukraine and the EU. 
Turkey Model. Turkey and the EU have agreed to a customs zone in which tariffs are imposed. There 
is no visa-free travel between Turkey and the EU nor is there free movement of people between 
Turkey and the EU. 
No Deal option. If no future relationship can be negotiated, World Trade Organization rules with strict 
regulations on quotas and tariffs would apply, as is currently the case between the United States and 
the EU.  
‘Insert Table 2 here’ 
 
The UK government’s aim is to negotiate an agreement that meets as many of its current and future 
objectives as possible. This means negotiating a 21-month transition period beyond March 29, 2019 
and keeping open options for collaboration on free trade in goods and services, on investment, and on 
immigration. One UK negotiation position which has been dubbed “hard Brexit” envisages no exit 
payment, a single market, and an end of the free movement of people between the UK and the EU. An 
opinion poll of German economics professors suggests that the best path for achieving the UK stated 
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goals would be to negotiate a Ukraine Plus Model with a view to eventually being able to negotiate a 
Norway Model (Gäbler, Krause, Kremheller, Loren & Potrafke, 2017). In the following section we 
apply a bargaining model to the positions taken by UK and EU negotiators in order to highlight the 
complexities and trade-offs involved.  
 
Immigration and trade agreements between the UK and EU – Indifference curve analysis 
 
We use the concept of indifference curves from the Edgeworth box (Edgeworth, 1925) with free 
movement of goods (trade integration) and of people (immigration integration) as the two 
“commodities” being traded. The concept of Pareto optimality complements this by helping to 
determine an optimal allocation of commodities. Pareto optimality is the allocation whereby it 
is not possible to make one negotiator better off without making any other negotiator worse off. This 
idea is further developed in game theory as an interactive multi-player decision-making game. We use 
bargaining theory as an application of game theoretical reasoning for an alternating offer scenario. 
Negotiation space, a concept borrowed as well from the Edgeworth box, is bound by two opposing 
objectives: (1) the UK is reluctant to allow unfettered EU immigration and (2) unimpeded EU 
immigration and trade are jointly the gateway to a future UK–EU relationship. In the case of the UK 
and EU, we consider trade integration (Mulabdic, Osnago & Ruta, 2017), ranging from free trade 
agreement, to customs union, to a common market, and to immigrant integration--a scalar view of the 
UK-EU relationship. 
 
We start with trade integration as x, and immigration integration as y. The indifference curves of the 
UK and the EU show a similar perspective in terms of negotiation space. In terms of trade integration, 
x, the EU accounts for 40% of UK trade (xEU) compared to 10% of trade to the UK from the EU (xUK). 
However, according to European Statistics (Eurostats, 2017), the export of UK goods to other EU 
member states grew from 100 billion euros in 2003 to 230 billion euros in 2015, highlighting the need 
for a trade agreement. When it comes to immigration integration, yEU shows the 2.9 million EU 
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citizens (0.6% of EU population) living and working in the UK, and yUK shows the 1.2 million UK 
citizens (1.9% of UK population) living and working in the EU.   
 
The endowment point W, through which the slope of any line passes, represents the ratio of trade 
integration and immigration integration. Thus, if that line is relatively steep, more has to be given up 
for immigration than for trade (immigration is relatively more expensive than trade). If the line is 
relatively flat, then the opposite is true. In the UK-EU case, an initial endowment W represents the 
UK and EU levels of trade and immigration integration available before negotiations. At the outset, 
the endowment position is common to both parties. Thus (XEU, YEU ) = WEU and (XUK, YUK ) 
= WUK where WEU and WUK represent the UK and the EU initial endowments in W. This would fit 
with the negotiations between the UK and EU. For the different bargaining positions, the two players 
will need to have their utility functions determined and positioned as in the diagram 1 below.  
‘Figure 1 goes here’ 
 
Nash bargaining suggests that the UK and EU will end up dividing the gains from renegotiation. The 
UK would prefer to end at the south-west border of the space (on the EU indifference curve) and the 
EU at the north-east border (on the UK indifference curve). Starting from those positions, they 
eventually end up somewhere in the middle, depending on the degree of symmetry in their bargaining 
strength. To explain the outcome, we can use a rational approach or a behavioral one.  
 
A GAME THEORETICAL BARGAINING MODEL FOR BREXIT 
 
The economics literature is rich in bargaining models, (Nash, 1952; Kalai & Smorodinski, 1975; 
Rubinstein, 1982, Muthoo, 1999). We use the indifference curve analysis presented above to throw 
light on the Brexit negotiations. We present a stylized representation of an alternating-offers 
bargaining game where players attempt to reach an agreement by making offers and counter-offers. 
This is reflective of most real-life negotiations where bargaining imposes costs on both players.  
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Let X denote the set of possible agreements for the two players UK and EU, in which x is used for 
one offer in the agreement set X. If the players i = (EU, UK) reach an agreement at time tΔ on x∈X, 
then the players’ payoff is  
 Ui(x)exp(-ritΔ),          (1) 
where Ui: X→ 𝑅 is player i’s utility function. For each x∈X, Ui(x) is the instantaneous utility that 
player i obtains from agreement x. If the players disagree, then each player’s payoff is zero. This 
means a set of possible utility pairs  𝛺= {(uUK, uEU), i.e., there exists x∈X such that UUK(x)=uUK and 
UEU(x)=uEU} is the set of utility pairs obtainable through agreement. The Pareto frontier 𝛺
e of the set 
𝛺 is a key concept in the analysis of the subgame perfect equilibria. A utility pair (uEU, uUK)∈  𝛺
e if 
and only if (uUK, uEU)∈  𝛺
 and there does not exist another utility pair (u’EU, u’UK)∈  𝛺 such that u’UK> 
uUK, u’EU> uEU and for some i, u’i> ui.  
 
Trade integration can be an x offer. Immigration integration (Y in the indifference curve analysis) can 
be added to the utility function of the bargaining game in the following way: The set of possible 
agreements X={(xUK, yUK): 0≤ 𝑥UK≤1 and 0≤ 𝑦UK≤1}, where xUK and yUK represent the levels of 
trade and immigration integration obtained by the UK and 1−𝑥UK and 1 − 𝑦UK those obtained by the 
EU. Should agreement x∈X at time tΔ be reached, then the EU payoff is  
UEU(xEU,yEU) exp(-rtΔ),         (2)  
where xEU =1−𝑥UK and yEU = 1 − 𝑦UK and r>0 is the common discount rate of the player at tΔ. 
The UK payoffs are  
UUK(xUK,yUK) exp(-rtΔ).         (3)  
    
The Pareto frontier 𝛺e of the set 𝛺 is possible with an agreement that maximizes one player’s utility 
and minimizes that of the other player. It is a concave function ψ, which is in the interval IEU ⊆ 𝑅 and 
the interval IUK ⊆ 𝑅 with 0 ∈ IEU and 0 ∈ IUK and ψ(0)>0 as impasse points (IEU, IUK). For each uEU ≥0, 
ψ(uEU)=max UUK(x) subject to x∈X and UEU(1−𝑥UK, 1 − 𝑦UK)≥ uEU. In the Subgame Perfect 
Equilibrium agreement x* ∈X is a solution to  
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 𝑚𝑎𝑥x∈X UEU(1−𝑥UK, 1 − 𝑦UK) UUK(x)       (4) 
Under the assumption that utility functions are differentiable, the first order conditions show 
that (x*UK,y*UK) is the unique solution to  
UEU(1−𝑥UK, 1 − 𝑦UK)
𝜕Uuk
𝜕𝑥𝑢𝑘
= UUK(xUK,yUK)
𝜕𝑈𝑒𝑢
𝜕𝑥𝑒𝑢
      (5) 
UEU(1−𝑥UK, 1 − 𝑦UK)
𝜕Uuk
𝜕𝑦𝑢𝑘
= UUK(xUK,yUK)
𝜕𝑈𝑒𝑢
𝜕𝑦𝑒𝑢
      (6) 
In the Rubinstein bargaining game, this is the marginal rate of substitution between trade integration 
and immigration integration: 
𝜕𝑈𝑢𝑘
𝜕𝑈𝑢𝑘
/𝜕𝑥𝑢𝑘
/𝜕𝑦𝑢𝑘
=
𝜕𝑈𝑒𝑢
𝜕𝑈𝑒𝑢
/𝜕𝑥𝑒𝑢
/𝜕𝑦𝑒𝑢
. Figure 2 shows the Pareto frontier for both 
players, the impasse points and the offer curve of the game. The frontier provides the space within 
which negotiations will take place and to which behavioral aspects can now be added. 
‘Figure 2 goes here’ 
 
This rational perspective helps identify the options available for Brexit negotiators. In the next section 
we deal with the uncertainties and complexities of the negotiation process. They are due to the fact 
that players adhere to different norms when it comes to information disclosure, use of threats, timing 
of concessions, standards of fairness, and willingness to enlist the help of mediators and arbitrators 
(Raiffa et al, 2002; Ott, 2013).  
 
NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS FOR BREXIT 
 
An application - intuition and real-life bargaining situation  
 
We now consider utility functions from an intuitive perspective given what we know about the UK 
and EU. The UK only accounts for about 10% of total EU trade, and some three million EU citizens 
reside in the UK. The EU utility function uEU reflects the EU tradeoff between trade and immigration 
integration given that preserving the open border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland is an additional objective, as is the settling of financial commitments made by the UK, that is, 
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a UK exit payment of €40bn negotiated in stage 2. The UK has a different utility function in which 
trade integration is important, perhaps most of all the possibility of negotiating trade agreements with 
third parties, although curtailing immigration from the EU is a main objective. 
 
Stage 1- Endowment situation.  For the UK, UUK(x, y)=uUK and UUK(xUK, yUK)= 4x+1.2y, with a trade 
ratio of 4 (40% of UK trade being with the EU) and 1.2 million UK citizens having emigrated to the 
EU. For the EU, UEU(x, y)=uEU and UEU(xEU,yEU)=x+3y, with a trade ratio of 1 (10% of EU trade is 
with the UK) and 3 million EU citizens having emigrated to the UK. This picture of the situation on 
the eve of Brexit is reflected in the endowment point and sets the starting point for the negotiations.  
 
Stage 2 - Exit payment negotiations. From a negotiation analytical perspective, the EU starting point 
is a €100bn exit payment from the UK, as “z” in an alternating offer game, the UK counter-offered 
with €20bn. After much back and forth, a €40bn (£39bn) settlement was agreed. In addition, the rights 
of UK citizens in the EU and EU citizens in the UK were made reciprocal. There may be any number 
of such negotiations involving different stakeholders. In the case of Brexit, the UK government must 
contend with a coalition partner that is in a position to hold it hostage, the Democratic Unionist Party 
of Northern Ireland. The EU on the other hand determined that in order to preserve the Good Friday 
Agreement, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland needed to be treated in the same way. The 
objectives spelled out in the White paper will be part of negotiations in the next stage of the process. 
The Northern Ireland-Republic of Ireland situation is very complicated and volatile, so it is not 
surprising that negotiations related to it would be. Indeed, how the border issues are settled could 
determine future UK security, even unity.   
 
Stage 3 - Trade agreements. We now look more closely at trade agreement options. We again use 
bargaining results and add the twelve objectives from the White Paper and negotiation outcomes. 
Continuing current security cooperation is in the interest of both parties and might have been dealt 
with in calculating the exit negotiation payment, but we can add it as “s” to the utility function.  
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UUK(x, y)=uUK and UUK(x,y)= αUK x+ ßUK y-40bn Exit payment, and  
UEU(x, y)=uEU and UEU(x,y)= αEUx+ßEUy +40bn where α and ß are parameters for the variables x and y 
(trade integration and immigration integration). An Irish border solution “ib” and security “s” can be 
added to the utility function for the UK as expressed above. The parameters can reflect the ratio used 
in the negotiation for trade and/or immigration integration.   To capture the uncertainty of the 
outcome, we can use the expected utility approach and assign probabilities to the feasibility of the 
agreement. Setting a variable 0 would mean that the preference relation is taken off the utility 
function. We use only the insights of the bargaining model which focus on the trade and immigration 
integration as a bargaining mechanism leading to the package negotiations of complex negotiations 
(Raiffa, et al, 2002) and a behavioral approach. 
 
uUK≥0 and uEU≥0 are the rationality assumptions for both players. In the case of no deal, uUK=0, but 
still with an exit payment added to the utility function, which is below the reservation value. A 
Norway Model would have UUK(x,y)= αUK x+ ßUK y-40bn, and an additional payment “z” for access to 
the single market UUK(x, y, z)>0. The Switzerland Model would have a utility function of UUK(xN) 
with only “x” relevant without immigration, but agreements for sectors, financial services in the case 
of the UK. Finally, “deep and special agreements” would need to be added to UUK(x, y) and with “s” 
for security and “ib” for the Irish border. We are now are able to assign zones in the Pareto frontier 
where outcomes are potentially feasible.  
 
Figure 3 sets out the utilities of the players, with the Pareto frontier divided into the region of feasible 
and potential agreements. We use indifference curves and the bargaining outcome of Figure 2 and 
positions the payoffs of the players in the Pareto frontier. Our analysis shows clearly that the region 
for trade agreements lies between the impasse points of both players but also beyond the reservation 
values.  
‘Figure 3 goes here’ 
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Application of the bargaining theoretical and negotiation analytical approach to the Brexit 
negotiations and the agreement zone follows a behavioral assumption of uncertainties. Raiffa et al 
(2002), Ghauri (2003), and Ott (2011) argue that cultural differences and strategic behavior are 
reflected in time preferences, action profiles, height of offers, and norms and values. In the next 
section we move a step closer to the potentially feasible agreement zones by showing how the best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) and Brexit strategies can determine negotiation 
outcomes.   
 
AGREEMENT ZONES FOR BREXIT 
 
Best alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA)  
 
Just like with any other negotiation, in Brexit both sides must calculate the possibility of deadlocks 
and anticipate possible agreements. If there is an impasse, what are the best outside options?  
Seasoned negotiators understand the value of determining their BATNA (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991), 
otherwise they will not be able to confidently walk away from a subpar offer (Fisher et al., 1991; 
Subramanian, 2007), thus, UK and EU negotiators experts will be aware of their bargaining power 
and their BATNA (Fisher et al., 1991; Malhotra, 2004). It is imperative that negotiators calculate the 
reservation value, that is, the lowest-valued deal acceptable. If the value of the deal proposed is lower 
than the reservation value, it is better to reject the offer and pursue the BATNA. If the final offer is 
higher than the reservation value, then acceptance is the best option. In the case of Brexit, it should be 
determined whether WTO rules, a customs union, the Switzerland Model, the Ukraine Plus Model or 
the Norway Model represents the BATNA.  
 
Agreement strategies and scenarios 
The EU referendum just gave people the choice to ‘Leave the European Union’ or ‘Remain a 
member of the European Union’. But there are lots of ways we could leave the EU. Hard 
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Brexit is at one end of the spectrum. It is about moving further away from the EU and cutting 
the main formal ties with the EU … Soft Brexit is at the other end of the spectrum, where we 
continue to have close formal ties with the EU.”  (Full Fact, 2017).  
Hard Brexit would mean that the UK would not allow free movement of people between the UK and 
the EU. As the free movement of goods, services, capital and people is at the core of the EU project, 
and the EU sees the four as indivisible, a strategy calling for three of the four exposes a problematic 
UK negotiation style. If the UK follows a hard Brexit strategy, it is likely that there will not be a deal. 
This would mean that the UK would have to rely on World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The 
WTO agreement signed in Marrakesh in 1994 and updated since serves as an umbrella agreement. It 
has annexes on intellectual property, dispute settlements, trade policy review mechanisms, multilateral 
agreements and other matters. While the WTO agreement is currently used for EU-US trade, the WTO 
does not set tariffs or taxes, its conflict resolution process is exceedingly long, and its remedies blunt 
instruments. With only WTO rules as a fallback position, it is clear that negotiation expertise will be 
important.  
 
Considering the short time horizon, the only successful strategy is to be close to a fair deal from the 
outset. This would demand that the negotiators put their cards on the table, which the EU negotiators 
have done in publicizing their strategy and regularly updating information on their approach on their 
websites with supporting information regarding the legal situation after the withdrawal (information 
acts, customs tariffs, interim solutions for exports, intellectual property rights, etc.).  
 
Soft Brexit, on the other end of the spectrum, would mean having close links to the EU, similar to 
those of the Norway Model. While Norway is not a member of the European Union, it has close trade 
links with the EU, and is in the EU single market—for which it pays about €400 million annually in 
grants. The citizens of Norway can move between EU countries freely and citizens of the EU can just 
as freely move to Norway. (Full Fact, 2017). Adopting the Norway Model would mean starting with a 
single market assumption for which the UK would have to make financial contributions, which some 
argue would not be in keeping with the propositions of the White Paper. Moreover, the UK would 
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have to reckon with the fact that the EU often refers to “cooperative exchange” regarding customs 
tariffs and quotas which indicates that payments alone would not be acceptable. This said, a soft 
approach would be a quicker way to reach a settlement.  
 
Mixed strategy profiles or a ‘concessionary’ Brexit strategy could lead to various ways to access EU 
goods, services, capital and labor markets along the lines of the Canada, Turkey and Ukraine Plus 
models. The UK negotiation strategy position strongly favors negotiating all these aspects at once. 
Besides the negotiation strategy profiles which include strategies related to immigration and trade, 
other strategies regarding planning, conflict resolution, and deal-making must be included. In this 
regard we can draw on the mechanisms identified in the negotiation literature (Raiffa, 1983; Susskind, 
2003; Ury, 1991; Malhotra, 2004, 2016). For Brexit, immigration needs to be dealt with first—the 
rights of UK citizens and EU citizens secured and then perhaps a quota/tier system. Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are the next stage, with an exit payment 
and tariffs following. This position may entail extreme negotiation behavior, such as haggling, i.e. 
starting with extreme offers, and quickly reducing bids as concessions to make for a shorter 
bargaining horizon.  On the other hand, it may mean using concessions as a relationship-building 
approach, which means longer negotiations that bind the parties and make it more difficult for them to 
opt out, and fair deal behavior for negotiations with a short-term view, i.e. making offers close to what 
negotiators want in the end (Ott, 2011). Concessions with a longer bargaining horizon give negotiators 
the opportunity to focus on relationships, thus difficult issues are not negotiated first, but only when a 
relationship has been established. This is a desirable strategy for the UK depending on background 
and atmosphere implications (Ghauri, 2003b).  
 
Feasible and potential agreements 
 
Negotiators on opposite sides of the table often have different visions of the future. The zone of 
possible agreement (ZOPA) can be overshadowed by information asymmetries, moral hazard 
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problems, cultural differences and complexity costs. However, negotiation theorists offer a way 
around these (Fischer et al., 1991; Ott, 2011; Subramanian, 2006; Ury, 1991). Before proposing a 
contingency, negotiators consider potential informational asymmetries and differing incentives that 
need to be resolved first, including complexity costs that might arise. Without looking forward and 
reasoning back, a move that could expand the pie might do just the opposite. We are left then with 
several important questions to address regarding the aims of the UK to find out whether they will be 
better off after the deal, whether they have considered a BATNA, and how they can create a positive 
and cordial atmosphere to keep the other side’s expectations high during the process. To reduce 
concerns, Brexit negotiators must consider conflict resolution mechanisms. The EU started with an 
excellent analytical approach by insisting on step-by-step negotiations. UK negotiators would be wise 
to do the same given that the negotiations are complex, uncertain, and to be concluded under intense 
time pressure. 
 
We now consider the agreement zone between the negotiating parties. The agreement zone reflects 
possibilities to reach an agreement acceptable to both sides when both parties cooperate (Raiffa, 1983; 
Ott et al., 2016). We assume that we have three different strategy profiles (hard, soft and mixed).  
Depending on the cultural and strategic backgrounds of the negotiators all three approaches and their 
response function or counter-offers from the bargaining model can be emphasized.  
 
Reservation values  
 
A UK hard Brexit strategy will lead to a narrow agreement zone and tit-for-tat measures (Axelrod, 
1984), and the consequence will be that the UK will have to fall back on WTO rules that will result in 
tariffs and import quotas. The strategy will be on the trade integration axis of Figure 3 on the lower 
end towards the origin and low on the immigration integration as well (almost zero). The rationale for 
a hard Brexit is the belief that the UK will benefit after leaving the EU from third-country agreements 
that will compensate for lower EU trade volume. However many of those third countries, notably 
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China and India arguably the biggest among them, already have trade agreements with the EU, and 
will want to continue to deal with the world’s biggest consumer market that also has the most buying 
power.  
 
Potential agreement 
 
The White Paper suggests that the UK wants to obtain strong access to the single market, as well as 
the possibility of signing free trade agreements with third countries. This would mean European 
Economic Area (EEA) membership, as Norway has had since 1992. A soft Brexit strategy would 
mean payment for single market access, but hand-in-glove with that would be free movement of 
people, again like the Norway Model. This implies high levels of trade and immigration integration 
and would define the potential agreement zone for the EU utility functions (along the x axis). 
However, the UK wants complete control over immigration. In addition, the UK does not want to be 
subject to rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In short, the aims of the UK diverge 
considerably from those of Norway. Alternatively, the UK could use the Switzerland Model, which 
offers access to the single market in specific sectors, although the EU’s negotiation position makes it 
unlikely that it will consider industry-specific arrangements at this point. In any case, the White Paper 
explicitly rejects acceptance of free movement of people, and for all intents and purposes the 
restrictions that Switzerland was allowed to place on the citizens of EU-2 countries (the newest EU 
members) will come to an end on 1 June 2019. On another front, Switzerland is currently involved in 
negotiations with the EU over the ECJ role in resolving trade disputes, which means that it is unlikely 
that the EU would agree to what the UK wants regarding the ECJ.  
 
Feasible agreement 
The concessionary approach would consider free trade agreements (FTAs), with third country trade 
agreements possible, which are low on trade integration but have the possibility to negotiate 
immigration quotas, since so far, no immigration integration for this option has been considered. A so-
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called “deep and special partnership” could be based on the Canada Model and Ukraine Plus Model, 
which would mean open market access, no free movement of people, and no ECJ oversight. The 
wide-ranging possibilities pose a complex conundrum for scholars and civil servants. A recent poll of 
the German Economists Expert Panel (Gäbler et al., 2017) shows that 31% of respondents believe that 
the UK will pursue a Ukraine Plus kind of model, 14% the Norway Model, and 23% the Switzerland 
Model, with some 14% saying the UK will seek an alternative like a free trade agreement and 18% 
having no idea of what to expect.  
 
Based on various agreement models, and the BATNAs of the UK and EU, the result may be close to 
the second trade agreement option set out by the EU--and already agreed between the EU and Canada 
and the EU and Ukraine. Those agreements fall within the feasible agreement zone shown in Figure 3 
but would still be below the initial endowment point of trade and immigration integration W, thus 
both parties will have lower utilities after Brexit.  
‘Insert Table 3 here’ 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Considering the short time period allowed for Brexit negotiations, the UK government needs to 
consider especially carefully its strategy profile and possible negotiation outcomes. Then, negotiators 
can align them with the agreement zones of the two parties. If BATNAs are anticipated, it will also be 
necessary to plan meticulously the strategy profiles, agreement models, impasse points, and feasible 
and possible agreement zones.  
 
The UK and EU have such markedly opposed aims and objectives that there could easily be major 
conflicts. The indifference curves for trade and immigration integration for both suggest that the 
negotiation space has not yet been grasped. The suggestion by the EU to start with a separate exit 
negotiation to then be followed by future relationship negotiations was a wise tactic and a rational 
approach given the asymmetries between the negotiators.  
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The indifference curve analysis shows the critical positions of the players regarding trade and 
immigration integration. We compared the features of the agreements between the EU and Norway, 
Switzerland, Canada, Turkey, and Ukraine, as well as the No Deal option leading to reliance on WTO 
rules, with the objectives of the UK government.  We analyzed alternating bargaining games given the 
utility functions of the parties based on preferences for trade and immigration integration. The results 
of the game theoretical bargaining model pave the way for the negotiation analytical part. The insights 
of the analysis provide the feasible and potential agreement zones for further Brexit negotiations. The 
Ukraine Plus Model can be seen as a feasible option aligned with the objectives of the UK 
government. A concessionary mixed strategy approach shows a possible outcome and is better than 
the Norway, Switzerland or Turkey models which are potential agreement zones for the UK and EU. 
The No Deal option falls below the reservation value zone. Regardless of there being a feasible 
agreement zone, we have shown that the Pareto optimal outcome for both the UK and the EU is the 
starting point of the negotiations – the endowment point. Our international negotiation analysis offers 
a basis on which we, as international business scholars, can export knowledge to other disciplines by 
using an interdisciplinary approach to analyze an important current phenomenon.   
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TABLES 
Table 1: The UK White Paper twelve principles  
UK Brexit Objectives Definitions 
1.  Provide certainty and clarity Brexit negotiations will be conducted as transparently as 
possible. Initially, EU law will continue to apply as national 
law after Brexit. Any Brexit agreement with the EU will be 
put before both Houses of Parliament for ratification.  
 
2. Take control over own laws Laws applicable in the UK will be made in the UK and 
interpreted only by UK courts, not by the European Court of 
Justice.  
 
3.  Strengthen the union of England, 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales 
The governments of England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Wales will work closely together to implement Brexit 
 
4.  Protect ties with the Republic of 
Ireland and maintain the common 
travel area 
The freedom to travel between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland will be maintained.  
 
5. Control immigration The UK intends to control the number of immigrants from the 
EU.  
 
6. Secure rights of UK and EU 
nationals 
The rights of EU citizens living in the UK and of UK citizens 
living in the EU will be guaranteed.  
 
7. Protect workers’ rights The level of protection provided workers under EU law will 
be maintained and extended.  
 
8. Ensure free trade with European 
markets 
The UK will seeks the greatest possible access to the EU 
single market for goods and services, and be willing in return 
to make financial contributions to the EU.  
 
9. Secure new trade agreements with 
third countries 
The UK aims to conclude its own free trade agreements with 
third countries.  
 
10. Ensure continued science and 
innovation excellence  
The UK aims to continue to collaborate with the EU in the 
areas of basic science and research and development.  
 
11. Cooperate with Europe on crime 
and terrorism  
The UK aims to continue to collaborate with the EU in the 
areas of foreign and defense policy and in combating crime 
and terrorism.  
 
12.  Achieve an orderly and smooth 
exit 
The UK seeks to have a transition period which will allow 
government and business time to adapt. 
Source: Based on HM Government, White Paper, 2017. 
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Table 2: Extent to which various deep and special trade agreement models of the EU meet UK 
objectives  
United Kingdom's Objectives Norway 
Model  
Switzerland 
Model  
Canada  Model Ukraine Plus 
Model 
No application of EU law 
(Objective 2)   
 - (√) √ √ 
No free movement (Objective 5)  - - √ √ 
Access to the internal market 
(Objective 8)  
√ (√) (√) (√) 
Own trade agreements with  
third countries (Objective 9)   
√ √ √ √ 
Collaboration on security and 
defense policy (Objective 11)   
- - - (√) 
Source: Pötsch and Van Roosebeke (2017, p. 5)  
Key: 
- -               Does not align with UK objectives 
(√)          Partially aligns with UK objectives, but needs special agreements 
√             Fully aligns with UK objectives 
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Table 3: Currently held beliefs versus insights from our analysis 
CURRENTLY HELD BELIEFS SPECIFIC INSIGHTS OF THIS ANALYSIS 
The Norway, Canada, and Turkey models and 
also the No Deal option would meet the UK 
objectives.  
The Ukraine Plus Model, which so far has not 
been considered by UK negotiators, aligns best 
with the principles outlined in the White Paper.  
The agreement zones would be more easily 
reached through alternative offers and BATNAs 
 
The UK negotiation strategy can only be “hard” 
or “soft”. 
There is a refined negotiation strategy which 
allows for a mixed strategy approach that would 
fit the Ukraine Plus Model or a unique UK 
model. The UK has suggested the Norway Model 
and Canada Model—with modifications. The 
Switzerland Model has been rejected by EU 
negotiators as it would mean striking agreements 
particular to some industries and regions. 
 
The key to fulfilling the wishes expressed by the 
majority of YES referendum voters is a Customs 
Union or a Free Trade Agreement. 
Our analysis shows that indifference curves can 
be used to express preferences for trade and 
immigration integration as a ratio thus showing 
the existence of tradeoffs and the possibility of 
designing a trade agreement that maximizes joint 
utilities. 
 
A Trade Agreement is not compatible with a 
reduction in immigration. 
The utility functions of the bargaining approach 
and Rubinstein solution to the bargaining 
problem provide a mechanism which shows the 
connection between trade and immigration 
integration.  
 
Negotiating a Trade Agreement is quick and 
easy. 
Trade, immigration, security, an open Irish 
border, and an exit payment all enter the utility 
function of both players. The negotiation analysis 
positions the outcome inside the Pareto frontier in 
which no player can be worse off. Feasible and 
Potential Agreement zones show that all options 
make both parties worse off than the pre-Brexit 
endowment situation. 
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Figure 1: Negotiation space for Brexit models  
 
Legend 
X …Trade integration – from free trade agreements to customs union to common markets to full trade 
integration  
Y …Immigration integration - from restricted immigration to free movement to full integration of 
immigrants into society 
W…UK and EU endowment points  
IC ... UK and EU indifference curves (see Appendix) 
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Legend 
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Figure 3: Feasible and potential agreement zones for the EU and UK 
Legend 
uEU      Utility function for the EU (uEU=UEU(xEU, yEU)) 
uUK      Utility function for the UK (uUK=UUK(xUK, yUK)) 
IUK   UK impasse point UK 
IEU  EU impasse point EU 
𝛺e   Pareto frontier  
RV EU and UK reservation values 
W EU and UK endowment points   
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APPENDIX 
Glossary of Technical Terms 
Technical Term  Explanation 
Edgeworth Box (Edgeworth, 1925) A common tool in general equilibrium analysis 
which allows the study of the interaction of two 
individual parties trading two different 
commodities. Exchange ratios between 
commodities are determined through an 
hypothesized auction process.  
Indifference Curve (in the context of exit 
negotiations) 
The curve of each party which shows equal utility 
for the two commodities traded. Along the 
indifference curve, any combination of the two 
commodities yields equal satisfaction. In the case 
of exit negotiations, each point on an indifference 
curve gives equal satisfaction for any 
combination of trade and immigration. 
Utility function The utility function u(x) assigns a numerical 
value to each element in X, ranking them in 
accordance with an individual’s preferences.   
Negotiation space The space in the Edgeworth box, where both 
parties have the possibility to negotiate a deal due 
to the joint set of exchange possibilities marked 
by the shape of the indifference curves between R 
and W.  
Initial endowment Assets at the beginning of the transactions, can be 
financial or non-pecuniary.  
Agreement zone The space between the two parties which has 
been derived from both sides offering over a 
period of time. The zone shows the space where 
contracts and deals are arrived at.  
 
 
 
 
 
